Rusty, I had decided to just let this thread slide off into irrelevant history to cause you no more problems, but since you are so good with the
when you think you'll gain something, both here and elsewhere, I'll toss this out to specifically answer your tomato can story:
The largely untested in battle M-14 was the battle rifle which many GI’s carried to Viet Nam early on. It quickly showed its strengths and weaknesses in combat. In firefights with the Russian AK-47, it exhibited superior accuracy, range, and power, but the size of the M-14/7.62x51 NATO combination offered a logistic disadvantage in jungle fighting. Smaller Viet Cong troops could carry a lot more ammo per man for their SKS and AK-47 rifles than could the average GI for the M-14, so in extended operations, the GI’s had to be regularly re-supplied while the Viet Cong still had sufficient ammo per man in most situations of extended contact. And on full auto, the M-14 was not very effective due to excessive recoil that affected good individual fire control.
As a result, even though the M-14 was a fairly new battle rifle, the military was soon looking for an alternative weapon in a smaller caliber that was easier to control in full-automatic fire than the M-14 allowed and that also allowed troops to carry more ammunition per man. Studies from past wars had taught them that most kills from small arms were at fairly close range, typically less than 300 meters. Studies had also taught that the side that shoots the most rounds tends to get the most kills. Obviously, the smaller round allowed for more ammo to be carried and expended.
As an aside: The US military was not the only ones considering getting away from large battle rifles and large battle rifle cartridges for standard troop issue. The Soviets as well as the British had looked extensively into developing a mid-range cartridge even smaller than the 7.62x51 NATO after WWII. The Soviets already had it in their SKS and AK-47 assault rifles chambered for 7.62x39 in the1940's.
The British had tried to get the US military to consider their smaller .280 round for NATO standardization years earlier, but we had instead forced the 7.62x51 on them. Hence they adopted the FN FAL rifle in 7.62x51 NATO. However, within a few years, the US military finally recognized the need for a smaller cartridge from the Viet Nam experience. From this came new and more intense interest in the fairly recent 1957 CONARC testing and recommendations. As stated before, the CONARC tested rifles had been provided by Armalite (a scaled down AR-10) and from Winchester, with the Armalite rifle being recommended along with the “222 Special” cartridge (later designated 223 Rem/5.56 NATO) with its 55 grain FMJ bullet.
Many in the US military (mainly the Army and USMC) vehemently resisted the adoption of the “mouse rifle” recommended by the CONARC testing so nothing happened for a few years following the conclusion of the military trials until our early experience in Viet Nam showed a need to re-think the issue.
Because Armalite was a relatively small company with limited financial backing and marketing capabilities, they sold the rights to their rifle to Colt in 1959 for $75,000 and a small commission on all rifles sold for a period of time to follow. Colt vigorously tried to market the rifle/cartridge combination to the US military as well as to numerous foreign military commands for several years from that point on with little success.
Here it comes Rusty:
On the 4th of July in 1960, Colt held a “picnic” for various military folks that included General Curtis LeMay who was soon to be the head of the Air Force. At the picnic, LeMay and a few others observed the AR-15 being shot at watermelons placed at 50, 100, and 150 yards down range. LeMay was the focus of the Colt Marketing demonstration because he had long voiced his negative opinion of the bulky M-14, and he wanted airmen to be able to carry a less bulky weapon than the M-14 for guard duty. LeMay was so impressed with the results on watermelons (once again, from the already existing CONARC recommended AR-15 rifle and cartridge combination) that one year later upon his promotion to USAF Chief of Staff in the summer of 1961, he immediately requested an order for 80,000 AR-15’s from Colt for the U.S. Air Force to replace their few remaining and aging M-1 30 Carbines and their bulky M-14’s for guard duty use at USAF facilities. However, upon the recommendation of General Maxwell D. Taylor who advised the Commander in Chief on such matters, he informed Kennedy that having two different calibers within the military system at the same time would be problematic. President Kennedy accepted Taylor’s advice and LeMay’s request was ultimately denied by the McNamara Department of Defense upon Kennedy's request. As a result, the M-14/7.62x51 combination remained unchallenged as the US small arms choice as the US Department of Defense definitely wanted all US combat troops moving forward in time to be equipped with the same rifle/cartridge combination.
As Viet Nam unfolded in the early 1960’s, the US Defense Department saw an immediate need for a solution to the M-14 combat and logistic issues and hastily settled on the already existing and later designated M-16/M193 Ball Ammo combo with all of its warts and good points totally unrecognized until combat in SE Asia showed both the good and the bad in both the rifle and the ammo, as has been well documented. How the rifle ended up largely untested in Viet Nam is another issue totally, but the topic is highly interesting none-the-less. As often happens, politics played a part.